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Anxiety disorders may not only be characterized by specific symptomatology (e.g.,
tachycardia) in response to the fearful stimulus (primary problem or first-level emotion)
but also by the tendency to negatively evaluate oneself for having those symptoms
(secondary problem or negative meta-emotion). An exploratory study was conducted
driven by the hypothesis that reducing the secondary or meta-emotional problem would
also diminish the fear response to the phobic stimulus. Thirty-three phobic participants
were exposed to the phobic target before and after undergoing a psychotherapeutic
intervention addressed to reduce the meta-emotional problem or a control condition.
The electrocardiogram was continuously recorded to derive heart rate (HR) and heart
rate variability (HRV) and affect ratings were obtained. Addressing the meta-emotional
problem had the effect of reducing the physiological but not the subjective symptoms
of anxiety after phobic exposure. Preliminary findings support the role of the meta-
emotional problem in the maintenance of response to the fearful stimulus (primary
problem).
Keywords: specific phobia, meta-emotional problem, double standard, phobic stimuli, heart rate, heart rate
variability, autonomic nervous system, self-criticism
INTRODUCTION
Emotions are complex and multidimensional: we not only feel an emotion, such as anger, fear,
or sadness as a response to a stimulus, but we also judge and feel emotions about our emotions.
Perceptions and appraisals of emotional states have long been recognized and described as meta-
experiences of mood and emotions (Mayer and Gaschke, 1988) or meta-emotions (Mendonca,
2013). Perceiving an emotion as problematic, aversive, or unacceptable, instead of normal,
comprehensible, and acceptable can influence the way a person regulates the emotional state itself
(Gardner et al., 1988; Hofmann, 2013).
From a clinical point of view, it is commonly accepted that patients may “disturb
themselves about their disturbances” (Dryden, 2000; p. 55). This phenomenon has been defined
as secondary problem or meta-emotional problem (Ellis, 1980, 2003), and it is considered
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a common feature of many affective disorders. For example, a
client might be depressed not only because he judges his layoff
as a sign of being a loser, but also because he considers his
depressive reaction (e.g., loss of interest and reduced energy)
further evidence of personal failure. He unintentionally gives
himself a ‘double dose’ or ‘two problems for the price of one’
(Dryden, 2000). As a common example, depressive rumination,
a key risk factor for clinical depression, is related to negative
thinking about depressive symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991,
2000). Similarly, social phobics often worry about the negative
consequences of their anxiety in social contexts (e.g., being
judged as weakling or stupid; DSM-V; American Psychiatric
Association [APA], 2013). The meta-emotional problem, other
than being trans-diagnostic, seems one of the most relevant
factors in psychopathology. For example, Clark and Beck (2010)
claim that: “the greatest differences between clinical and non-
clinical anxiety are evident in the secondary, strategic controlled
processes responsible for the persistence of anxiety. For the
clinical individual, further elaboration results in persistence and
even escalation of anxiety, whereas the same processes result in
reduction and possible termination of the anxiety program for
the non-clinical person” (p. 53).
The role of negative self-evaluation in amplifying emotional
reactivity has been indirectly confirmed by research on self-
criticism. Self-criticism has mostly been described as a personality
trait that leads people to experience frustration and anger
toward themselves when they face setbacks and failures
(Blatt, 2004; Gilbert et al., 2004). A growing number of
studies confirmed that trait self-criticism is a trans-diagnostic
phenomenon implicated in the development and maintenance
of a range of psychological difficulties (Schanche, 2013) as
it triggers, perpetuates, and intensifies emotional reactivity
(Shahar, 2013). However, self-critical attitude has mostly been
explored in relation to general life failures and setbacks, and
research has mainly employed a self-report questionnaire. The
key difference between self-criticism and the meta-emotional
problem is that in the latter patients only criticize themselves
for having a specific emotion, whereas self-criticism is much
more pervasive and refers to all aspects of a patient’s
life.
To the best of our knowledge, no studies have directly
investigated how reducing negative evaluations (meta-emotional
problem) of a specific negative emotional reaction (primary
problem) impacts the experience of the emotional reaction
by itself. In particular, there is no clear evidence that the
decrease of the negative judgment of a phobic reaction has an
impact on the primary emotional reaction that is the object
of the critical judgment, especially in a clinical population.
Whereas existing studies focused on the relationship between
self-criticism and depressive symptomatology (e.g., Schanche,
2013), the relationship between the meta-emotional problem and
anxiety symptomatology has been less explored. A noteworthy
exception is provided by Wells’ Metacognitive Therapy (Wells,
2000) that has been applied in the context of both generalized
anxiety and social phobia. The author found reductions in
fear of negative evaluation after the administration of a brief
metacognitive-focused treatment to such anxiety disorders (e.g.,
Wells, 2007). However, whereas the core target of Well’s
Metacognitive Therapy is on erroneous beliefs about worry
and unhelpful mental regulation strategies, the main goal of
the present investigation is to investigate the meta-emotional
problem in a broader sense and particularly its relationship
to the primary problem. Additionally, while the metacognitive
model focuses primarily on dysfunctional ways of relating
to negative thoughts and beliefs, meta-emotional problems
refer specifically to dysfunctional ways of evaluating and
relating to negative emotional experiences. Moreover, a closer
investigation of how a relatively simple and short intervention
to change the evaluation of a phobic emotional reaction
impacts the emotional reaction itself has not been conducted
so far.
To investigate this process, we explored the effect of the
decrease of the meta-emotional problem (e.g., ‘Having this fear
is sign of weakness’) on anxiety symptoms (e.g., tachycardia)
in patients with specific phobia (e.g., spider phobia). Specific
phobia is one of the most prevalent mental disorders in the
general population (Choy et al., 2007). This anxiety disorder
is characterized by a marked and persistent fear of a specific
object or situation (e.g., flying, heights, animals, receiving
an injection, seeing blood), and generally patients recognize
that their anxiety is excessive or unreasonable, and criticize
themselves for being weak or for constantly overestimating
how dangerous a situation is (DSM-V; American Psychiatric
Association [APA], 2013).
Together with such subjective experience of heightened
arousal, there is considerable evidence that subjects with specific
phobia (animal sub-type) show increased heart rate (HR) and
sympathetic activity during exposure to the phobic stimulus
(e.g., Prigatano and Johnson, 1974; Sarlo et al., 2002). The sole
focus on indices of sympathetic activity has, however, been
highlighted as a limit of previous studies (Friedman and Thayer,
1998). During the past decades heart rate variability (HRV) has
been increasingly used to understand the phenomenology of
anxiety disorders, therefore in the present study we evaluated HR
and measures of HRV as indices of autonomic nervous system
responses to a phobic stimulus.
Our objective was to test if a brief intervention (Double
Standard intervention; Leahy, 2003) designed to reduce negative
self-evaluations in phobic patients may impact their reactivity to
the phobic stimulus, both at subjective and psychophysiological
levels. Double standard intervention is supposed to reduce
negative self-evaluation by asking people to apply to themselves
the same standards of evaluation that they would use to evaluate
other people, which are usually milder (Leahy and Holland,
2000). We expected that, in comparison to a first exposure,
a decrease in the meta-emotional problem would reduce the
intensity of the emotional (levels of anxiety, disgust, etc.) and
physiological (HR and HRV) fear reaction to the same phobic
stimulus presented in a second exposure. This would provide
preliminary evidence that modulating the negative evaluation of
an emotional reaction impacts the experience of the emotional
reaction itself, confirming the meta-emotional problem as one
of the possible mechanisms responsible for the maintenance of
phobic reactions.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Recruitment was conducted by flyers, websites, and social
networks. The sample was composed of 33 participants,
6 men and 27 women, mean age 28.8 (9.8) years. The
significant difference in gender reflects the fact that phobias
are much more common in women than in men (e.g.,
Arnarson et al., 1998). All subjects were Caucasian and native
Italian speaking. Exclusionary criteria were major psychiatric or
cognitive problems requiring immediate treatment, psychotic or
organic illnesses, substance abuse, cardiovascular disease, use
of drugs/medications that may affect cardiovascular function,
obesity (body mass index > 32 kg/m2), menopause, use of oral
contraceptives during the previous 6 months, and pregnancy or
childbirth within the last 12 months. People with flying phobia
were excluded due to the practical difficulties with the exposure
videos for these phobic stimuli. Injection phobia and blood
phobia were excluded due to the peculiar autonomic nervous
system reaction that characterizes these specific phobias (e.g.,
Sarlo et al., 2002; Ayala et al., 2010).
All participants had a Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (4th edition, DSM-IV; American Psychiatric
Association [APA], 1994) diagnosis of Specific Phobia-Animal
Type, as confirmed by administration of the Structured Clinical
Interview for the DSM-IV (SCID-I; First et al., 1997) prior to
data collection. The specific phobias distribution was as follows:
spiders (n = 8), bugs (n = 6), bees (n = 4), cats (n = 3),
grasshoppers (n = 2), dogs (n = 2), butterflies (n = 2), snakes
(n = 2), pigeons (n = 2), insects (n = 1), lizards (n = 1). The
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Personality
Disorders Questionnaire and Interview (SCID-II; First et al.,
1997) were also administered to assess potential co-morbidities.
All patients were medication-free at the time of the study.
The protocol was approved by the local Ethics Committee.
Participants received 20 Euros as a compensation for their time.
Video-Clips
Each subject was presented twice with the same 30-s video-
clip. Following the methodology used by Schaefer et al. (2014),
each video-clip was selected from a variety of nature programs
based on the specific phobia of the participant. Eleven exemplars
of videos were selected including moving spiders, bugs, bees,
cats, grasshoppers, dogs, butterflies, snakes, pigeons, insects, and
lizards (see Figure 1 for an example of the screenshot). For
research purpose, the videoclips are available from the authors
upon request. The video-clips used in the present study have
not been previously validated; however, each of them has been
preliminarily administered to a sample of 10 phobics and 10 non-
phobic individuals eliciting significant differences in self-reported
levels of anxiety and fear (ps < 0.0001).
Questionnaires
After a phone pre-screening interview, a series of socio-
demographic questions and the following questionnaires were
administered on line via a survey system which guarantees the
privacy and confidentiality of the respondents1:
(1) The Disgust Scale Revised (DS-R, Olatunji et al., 2007),
which confirmed the Three-Factor Structure and showed
good psychometric properties in its Italian translation
(Olatunji et al., 2009);
(2) The Italian adaptation of the STAI (Spielberger et al., 1970)
by Pedrabissi and Santinello (1989);
(3) The SCID-II Questionnaire (SCID-II-Q; First et al., 1997)
administered on line with the aim to guide and shorten the
subsequent interview.
Finally, participants were asked: “How much do you consider
objectively dangerous the target of your phobia?”
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the DS-R, the STAI, and the
SPQ were greater than 0.75 in the present study.
Visual Analog Scales
During the experimental session, participants were asked to rate
their current levels of feeling Happy, Sad, Anxious, Embarrassed,
Angry, Calm, Dirty, Disgusted, and Ashamed on separate visual
analog 100-point scales. The use of Visual Analog Scales to assess
mood has been previously validated as a measure of emotional
self-report in the context of anxiety (Rossi and Pourtois, 2012;
Abend et al., 2014) and depression (van Rijsbergen et al., 2012,
2014). Given that disgust may play an important role in the
physiological response to the phobic stimulus, levels of feeling
Dirty were measured together with the commonly assessed mood.
Moreover, given our specific interest in the meta-experience of
mood and emotions, levels of being Embarrassed and Ashamed
were also assessed.
After the first and second video presentations, participants
were also asked to rate how much they considered objectively
dangerous the phobic stimulus that they had just seen.
1www.QuestionPro.com
FIGURE 1 | Example of screenshot for the video-clip related to pigeon phobia.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 July 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1105
fpsyg-07-01105 July 22, 2016 Time: 13:57 # 4
Couyoumdjian et al. Meta-Emotional Problem in Phobic Response
TABLE 1 | Baseline differences between the two experimental groups.
Double standard
(n = 16)
Control (n = 17) t/χ2 p
Age 28.4 (10.5) 29.3 (9.4) 0.26 0.79
Gender 14 F, 2 M 13 F, 4 M 0.67 0.41
Phobia 1Be, 1D, 3C, 1I, 1G,
1P, 4S, 4B, 1Sn
3Be, 1D, 1L, 1G, 1P,
4S, 2B, 1Sn
8.64 0.64
Comorbidies 11 No, 5 Yes 10 No, 6 Yes 0.14 0.71
Meta-emotional
problem
intensity
6 (1.6) 6 (1.7) 0.01 0.99
STAI 45.7 (7.3) 45.1 (9.2) −0.24 0.81
DS-R 60.1 (4.2) 58.6 (5.1) −0.95 0.35
Objectively
dangerous
2.7 (1.2) 2.3 (0.9) −1.03 0.31
HR 84.5 (8.6) 85.8 (10.5) 0.39 0.70
RMSSD 37.3 (13.8) 35.2 (12.3) −0.46 0.65
HF-HRV 48.7 (15.9) 52.2 (19.0) 0.57 0.58
LF-HRV 42.9 (17.8) 40.0 (19.2) −0.45 0.66
F, females; M, males; Be, bees; D, dogs; C, cats; I, insects; G, grasshoppers; P,
pigeon, S, spiders; 4 B, bugs; Sn, snake.
Psychophysiological Measures
The electrocardiogram (ECG) was continuously monitored
(Monitoring, Adatec s.r.l., Italy) with a standard electrode
configuration (right clavicle and precordial site V6). Three
disposable Ag/AgCl electrodes were used. Successive interbeat
intervals (in milliseconds) within each period were written
to single text files. Time (Root Mean Square Successive
Difference; RMSSD) and frequency (low-frequency HRV; LF-
HRV (0.04–0.15 Hz), high-frequency HRV; HF-HRV (0.15–
0.4 Hz)) domain measures of HRV were then obtained using
HRV Analysis Software (Niskanen et al., 2004). According to
the Task Force guidelines (1996), RMSSD reflects the integrity of
vagus nerve-mediated autonomic control of the heart, HF-HRV
reflects parasympathetic activity, and LF-HRV is proportional to
sympathetic activity but influenced by parasympathetic tone.
Procedure
The study was conducted at the Department of Psychology,
University of Rome. Participants were asked to refrain from (a)
eating, (b) drinking alcohol, tea, or coffee, and (c) strenuous
exercise 2 h preceding the scheduled appointment. Participants
were seated in a comfortable chair in the experimental room.
After providing written informed consent, participants first filled
out the series of online questionnaires.
A brief semi-structured interview was conducted in order to
assess the nature and the intensity of the meta-emotional problem
(e.g., “How childish do you evaluate yourself?”). Specifically,
subjects were asked to define what they thought about their
phobic reaction, and why it was problematic for them, and to rate
how much they believed such evaluation to be true for them on
a Likert scale from 0 (completely false for me) to 7 (completely
true for me). This interview was used to clinically assess the
meta-emotional problem and determine the focus of the Double
Standard Technique.
After this interview, subjects were then instrumented for
cardiovascular monitoring. Half of the sample (n = 16) was
randomly assigned to the experimental condition (modulation
of the meta-emotional problem), while the other participants
(n = 17) were assigned to the control condition (i.e., 5 min
rest). As shown in Table 1, the two groups were matched for age
and gender. The Double Standard is a cognitive technique that
examines the nature and rationale of applying one standard to
the self and a more tolerant standard to others (Leahy, 2003). It
can be used to modify dysfunctional thoughts about the Self. It
generally consists of asking the patient to express an evaluation
on his/her own defect and evaluate how he/she (or people that
he/she regards with esteem) would judge another person with the
same problem (see Appendix for the exact script that has been
used in the present experiment). The technique was administered
by a licensed cognitive-behavioral psychotherapist.
For each participant in the experimental group, the target of
the Double Standard was the evaluation of their own phobia that
emerged during the semi-structured interview (e.g., I evaluate
myself as childish). Participants assigned to the control condition
were asked to rest quietly with their eyes open for 5 min. The
experimental protocol consisted of: (a) 5 min rest, (b) subjective
rating of emotions (Visual Analog Scales; VAS), (c) 30-s video, (d)
subjective rating of emotions (VAS), (e) 5 min double standard
vs. 5 min rest, (f) subjective rating of emotions (VAS), (g)
5 min recovery period, (h) 30-s video, (i) subjective rating of
emotions (VAS), (j) 5 min recovery period, (k) subjective rating
of emotions (VAS), (l) administration of the Structured Clinical
Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Personality Disorders, (SCID-
II), (m) debriefing and compensation. The total duration of the
experimental protocol was identical for both conditions, i.e.,
21 min plus the time needed to complete the VAS and the SCID
interview.
Data Analysis
Data processing was performed using Statistica 8.0 (StatSoft.
Inc, USA). To control for the presence of preexisting differences
between the two experimental subgroups, two sample t-tests were
computed on the following variables: age, intensity of meta-
emotional problem, evaluation of objective danger, obsessive-
compulsive tendencies, trait anxiety, disgust sensitivity, baseline
levels of each emotion, HR, RMSSD, HF-HRV, and LF-HRV. Chi
square comparison was conducted for gender, type of phobia, and
presence or absence of comorbidities.
Low and HF-HRV were natural-log transformed (ln) because
their distributions were highly skewed. To test for the
effectiveness of the phobic induction, a series of t-test were
computed on HR, RMSSD, and each reported emotion as a
function of Time (Before vs. After the first video presentation).
To test for the efficacy of the Double Standard Technique
in the experimental group, a paired t-test (Before vs. After the
Double Standard) was conducted on scores at the first (“How
[core evaluation of their meta-emotional problem] do you rate
yourself, in a scale of 1–10?”) and the last (“How [core evaluation
of their meta-emotional problem] do you rate yourself now, in
a scale of 1–10?”) questions of the Double Standard Technique
(see Appendix).
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Two 2 × 2 General Linear Models (GLMs) with Group
(Double Standard vs. Control) as a between subject variable and
Presentation (First, Second) as a within-subject variable were
conducted on HR and RMSSD during exposure to the videos.
Frequency domain measures were not included as dependent
variables in this analysis due to the short duration of video
exposure (i.e., 30 s). In fact, the Task Force guidelines report
that 1 min is needed to assess the HF components of HRV while
approximately 2 min are needed to address the LF component.
A second series of 2 × 2 GLMs with Group (Double Standard
vs. Control) as a between subject variable and Presentation (First,
Second) as a within-subject variable were conducted on HR,
RMSSD, HF-HRV, LF-HRV, each considered emotion (VAS), and
participants’ evaluation of danger after exposure to the videos. To
control for individual differences, baseline levels of the examined
physiological and emotional variables were included in each
model as a covariate.
Eta-squared (η2) was calculated to quantify the effect sizes of
significant results.
RESULTS
Initial data screening revealed no significant baseline differences
between the two experimental groups (see Table 1). Moreover,
there were no differences between the two groups regarding the
type of evaluation about their phobia (meta-emotional problem):
almost the totality of participants in both groups reported their
phobia to be problematic because they saw it as a sign of weakness
or irrationality.
The first video was effective in inducing a phobic response,
as showed by significant changes in HR [t(31) = −4.65;
p < 0.0001], RMSSD [t(32) = 3.56; p = 0.001] during the
videos, and levels of being Happy [t(32) = 2.47; p = 0.02],
Angry [t(32) = −2.20; p = 0.03], Calm [t(31) = 3.96;
p < 0.0001], Dirty [t(32) = −2.71; p = 0.01], and Disgusted
[t(32) = −6.73; p < 0.0001], immediately after the exposure to
the videos. Changes in levels of being Angry and Happy did
TABLE 2 | Effectiveness of the first video in inducing a phobic response on
the examined variables.
M (SD)b M (SD)v1 t P
Happy 48.2 (19.9) 37.9 (25.1) 2.47 0.02
Sad 19.4 (21.7) 18.6 (21.6) 0.25 0.80
Anxious 40.8 (27.5) 48.3 (29.9) −1.38 0.18
Angry 16.5 (23.9) 20.2 (24.9) −2.20 0.03
Disgusted 11.4 (22.2) 54.0 (31.5) −6.73 <0.0001
Calm 46.0 (23.3) 32.3 (26.0) 3.96 <0.0001
Dirty 9.5 (17.2) 21.7 (29.8) −2.71 0.01
Embarassed 28.5 (24.6) 25.2 (25.9) 0.90 0.37
Ashamed 21.1 (22.9) 24.9 (26.6) −0.90 0.38
HR 85.2 (9.5) 36.2 (12.9) −4.65 <0.0001
RMSSD 36.2 (12.9) 31.6 (11.4) 3.56 0.001
M, mean; SD, standard deviation; b, during baseline; v1, during (HR, RMSSD) or at
the end of (VASs) video 1.
not survive Bonferroni correction. Means, standard differences,
and statistical results for all the examined variables are shown in
Table 2.
The Double Standard technique resulted effective in reducing
the meta-emotional problem [t(15)= 4.47; p< 0.0001].
As to the GLMs, a significant Group × Presentation
interaction emerged for HR during exposure to the videos,
F(1,29) = 5.52, p = 0.03; η2 = 0.14. Post hoc analyses showed
no differences between the two groups during the first exposure
(M = 90.2, SD = 9.7 and M = 89.2, SD = 10.4 for the
experimental and control group, respectively), but confirmed
diminished HR responses in the experimental group (M = 85,
SD = 12.1) compared to controls (M = 90.1, SD = 9.3) during
the second exposure (p = 0.02); see Figure 2). The main effects
of Group or Presentation were not significant. A marginally
significant main effect of Presentation [F(1,29) = 3.77, p = 0.06]
but no significant effects of Group or Group × Presentation
emerged for RMSSD.
Significant Group × Presentation interactions emerged for
LF-HRV, F(1,29) = 4.74, p = 0.04; η2 = 0.12 and HF-HRV,
F(1,29)= 13.16, p= 0.001; η2 = 0.28 after exposure to the videos.
As to LF-HRV, post hoc analyses showed a significant increase
in controls (M = 37.5, SD = 12.5 to M = 45.6, SD = 15.6;
p = 0.004) but not in the experimental group (M = 47.5,
SD = 19.5 to M = 45.5, SD = 22.6; p = 0.07) after the second
compared to the first video exposure. The HF-HRV pattern was
the opposite for the experimental and the control groups with
a significant increase in the former (M = 42.3, SD = 14.6 to
M = 47, SD = 17.5; p = 0.04) and a significant decrease in
the latter (M = 51.5, SD = 15.6 to M = 44.4, SD = 15.6;
p = 0.002). The HF-HRV increase in the experimental group did
not survive Bonferroni correction. Figure 3 depicts the results of
the significant interactions for recovery values.
No significant effects of Presentation, Group or
Group × Presentation interaction emerged for levels of feeling
Sad (Fs < 0.87; ps > 0.36), Happy (Fs < 0.18; ps > 0.67), Anxious
(Fs < 0.55; ps > 0.46), Embarrassed (Fs < 2.83; ps > 0.10),
Angry (Fs < 0.43; ps > 0.52), Calm (Fs < 0.49; ps > 0.49), Dirty
(Fs < 2.62; ps > 0.12), Disgusted (Fs < 0.39; ps > 0.54), and
Ashamed (Fs < 0.83; ps > 0.37).
Baseline value was a significant covariate in all the examined
models (ps < 0.05). Importantly, including the presence of a
comorbid depression disorder (yes/no) as an additional covariate
did not change our results significantly.
Simple correlation analyses of delta values were performed to
test for associations between the amount of reduction in meta-
emotional problem and (a) the levels of objectively perceived
danger and (b) reduction of physiological responses during
exposure. Interestingly, a marginally significant association
emerged between changes in the meta-emotional problem
and how objectively dangerous participants perceived the
object of their phobia (r = −0.34; p = 0.065). Moreover,
changes in the meta-emotional problem were significantly
correlated with the amount of changes in LF-HRV (r = −0.40;
p = 0.04) and marginally correlated with changes in HF-HRV
(r = 0.32; p = 0.08). No significant associations emerged
for HR.
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FIGURE 2 | Group × Presentation interaction for HR during exposures
to the videos, controlling for baseline HR.
DISCUSSION
The goal of the present study was to test whether reducing
negative evaluations (secondary or meta-emotional problem) of a
specific negative emotional reaction (primary problem) impacted
the experience of the emotional reaction itself. Although the
effects of meta-cognitions and meta-emotions on primary
cognitions and emotions have long been described (Norman and
Furnes, 2016 for a review), to the best of our knowledge, no
studies directly investigated the relationship between secondary
evaluations and emotional reactions in phobic patients.
In this study, reducing the meta-emotional problem had
the effect of reducing the physiological but not the subjective
symptoms of anxiety during and after phobic exposure.
Therefore, results partially supported the hypothesis of a causal
role of the meta-emotional problem in phobic reaction. More
specifically, results provided preliminary support to the notion
that reducing meta-emotional problem contributes to decrease
the autonomic arousal (via decreased HR and increased HRV)
to the phobic stimulus. Consistent findings have been reported
by Rockliff et al. (2008). In their study, low trait self-criticism
subjects who received an imagery-based intervention (i.e., the
Compassionate Image; Gilbert and Procter, 2006), aimed to
reduce self-criticism, showed increased HRV. However, self-
criticism can be considered as a broader concept compared to the
meta-emotional problem. In fact, self-criticism has been mostly
described as a trait, and it has been explored in relation to general
FIGURE 3 | Group × Presentation interactions for HRV-related
parameters after exposures to the videos, controlling for baseline
levels.
life failures and setbacks. Our study has provided preliminary
support to the notion that even a basic phobic response can be
modulated by changing the appraisal of the emotional reaction
from an “abnormal,” “incomprehensible” and “stupid” one, to a
more “comprehensible” and “acceptable” one.
Contrary to our expectation, subjective ratings of arousal did
not change following the cognitive intervention and remained
as high as at baseline in both groups. This result is in contrast
to Sartory et al. (1977) who found a strong positive linear
relationship between HR changes and subjective fear ratings
at intense fear levels but is in agreement with a series of
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studies that reported a discrepancy between physiological and
subjective measures in phobics. For example, animal phobics
reported a strong increase in subjective anxiety after forced
exposure, without accompanying changes in prolactin levels
(Nesse et al., 1980). The same authors replicated this result
showing no correlations between HR, blood pressure, plasma
levels of adrenaline, noradrenaline, cortisol and growth hormone,
and state anxiety with the subjective reports being stronger
compared to the physiological ones (Nesse et al., 1985). More
recently, Van Duinen et al. (2010) showed a strong dissociation
between subjective arousal and cortisol response to spider phobia.
The same pattern was found in driving phobia by Alpers et al.
(2003). The lack of correspondence between subjective and
objective arousal is also supported by correlational research with
rs< 0.25 in high anxious individuals (e.g., Mauss et al., 2003). The
present study does not experimentally identify the causes of such
discrepancy. According to our interpretation of the phenomenon,
the belief to be a fearful person is extremely credible for the
patient, therefore it guides introspection in a confirmatory way,
eluding the sensorial information that would justify the change.
The double standard technique is likely to reduce the negativity
of the evaluation but not its credibility.
Several limitations need to be acknowledged. The major
weakness of the study is that our control condition was a passive
one (i.e., rest). This constrains the scope of this study as other
variables might have explained the reduction in arousal, for
example just receiving a form of treatment vs. not receiving any
treatment. Despite this shortcoming, the present study provides
a set of preliminary results that are promising from a clinical
perspective and therefore can lead to a larger research program.
Future research should indeed include a third condition in
which participants perform a task requiring some reflection
about their phobias, without impacting their meta-emotional
self-evaluations. Strictly related to this limitation, the present
study did not include a measure of the meta-emotional problem
before and after the 5-min rest condition in the control group.
From a statistical point of view, the adequate way to test for the
efficacy of the Double Standard condition would have been to
directly compare its effects with those of the 5-min rest condition.
We chose not to do so for several reasons: first, it is implausible
to think that the meta-emotional problem would have changed
(in particular decreased) during a 5-min resting period. More
importantly, asking phobic patients twice in a 5-min interval,
for example: “Think about your fear of pigeons, how stupid do
you rate yourself, in a scale of 1–10?” would have likely directed
their attentional focus on their meta-emotional problem, eliciting
ruminative and worrisome thoughts about it, and therefore
possibly increasing the anxiety symptomatology (e.g., Ottaviani
and Shapiro, 2011). In our opinion, this would have artificially
inflated our results. Third, there are ethical reasons why it is
important not to direct patients’ attention on their psychological
vulnerabilities and then present them again with the object of
their phobia.
Second, the sample is quite small, which makes impossible
to understand the effects of different rates of self-criticism
tendencies and of subpopulations responding differently to the
interventions. Moreover, women were twice as much as men in
our sample. Although this reflects the fact that specific phobia is
more frequent in women compared to men, it may have biased
some of the results. Therefore, caution is needed in generalizing
results to males.
Third, all participants in our sample were characterized by the
presence of the secondary problem. This prevented us to test if the
initial response to the phobic stimulus would be different in those
who have and those who do not have this additional problem.
Fourth, in light of the dissociation between changes on
the physiological and the subjective measures, it would have
been greatly informative to assess whether the meta-emotional
problem re-occurred after the second exposure, especially given
that this exposure elicited very negative subjective emotions.
However, the aim of the present study was to test if a reduction
of the meta-emotional problem would be effective in reducing the
affective and physiological response to the phobic stimulus. Being
the reduction of the meta-emotional problem our experimental
manipulation and not our dependent variable, unfortunately we
did not include a post-assessment of this variable after the second
video.
Lastly, only short-term effects were examined, thus limiting
the clinical meaning of present findings.
Future studies should overcome these limitations and
further explore the role of the meta-emotional problem in
different psychopathological disorders in comparison of healthy
individuals. It would be interesting to evaluate if and how
the secondary or meta-emotional problem contributes to the
maintenance of the primary problem and not only to its
enhancement. Moreover, the role played by early life experiences
of emotional invalidation (Linehan, 1993), such as being ridiculed
or debased for the fear of dogs, in the development of the
meta-emotional problem should be explored.
As a clinical implication, the presence of the meta-emotional
problem should be assessed in order to determine if exposure
therapy for specific phobias would benefit from the addition
of cognitive intervention. It would be important to clarify if
and how the presence of the secondary or meta-emotional
problem represents an obstacle to the successful overcoming
of the primary problem, in order to establish the therapeutic
priorities: the secondary problem leaves room for the resolution
of the primary problem or is it necessary to start by shaping it?
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APPENDIX
Questions of the Double Standard technique
1. Think about your fear of _____, how ____ do you rate yourself, in a scale of 1 to 10?
2. Now, think about a friend of yours, which is similar to you and that you respect. Please, imagine that also your friend is frightened
from ____. How ____ do you rate him/her, in a scale of 1 to 10?
3. Now, think about three persons that know both you and your friend. How ____ would they rate your friend for his/her fear of
____, in a scale of 1 to 10?
4. Now, think about the same three persons. How ____ would they rate you for your fear of ____, in a scale of 1 to 10?
5. Now, think again about your fear of ____, how ____ do you rate yourself now, in a scale of 1 to 10?
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